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Bullies at home and abroad

Reminiscing about what happened in the playground of my local village primary school is still quite a sobering experience for me. Back in the 1950s if you weren't in a gang, you were definitely fair game for those who were, and who fancied themselves as tough leaders of their minor 'armies' of followers. Bullies abounded and I noticed that those they picked on had little chance to resist and those that did were beaten up. Trying to appease the bullies was always an unpleasant option, but one that when taken unfortunately didn't stop them or their minions from returning the next day to harass, taunt and demand sweets or other favours from those deemed weaker than themselves. Clearly, failure was endemic with appeasement in the school yard. Those appeased were neither flattered nor deceived by those who gave in to them. They saw it as their right to exploit their strength against those who couldn't stand up to them. They despised weakness in others and regarded plundering from them as a perfectly normal procedure.

Being good at sport saved me and my independence, but those who weren't in gangs often had no safety barrier, or friends, to protect them. It struck me at the time that this may indeed have been the natural order of things, even though it was both grotesque and unfair. Being brighter than the bullies was certainly not a positive. On the contrary, it was often a magnet for those who could not stand to be shown up in any classroom setting. I could only imagine what those

who suffered from this daily or regular abuse must have felt like, since it was a prolonged nightmare. Where were the teachers who might have been able to exercise some control over the bullies? Elsewhere. Missing in Action. Ever since those times I have disliked bullies, and despised those who would allow them free range to hurt others.

Have we learnt anything from the past when it comes to facing this kind of threat? I seriously doubt it. Bullies love their power and making their own rules, and they continue to discriminate against their perceived enemies. Gangsters of all kinds still proliferate and so do other bullies who nominally grasp their power from more conventional means, such as local and/or national politics, business, and any other occupation if it comes to it. Might isn't right under any circumstances and yet this attitude still proliferates. We see it in national leaders who love to wield power, to grab the spotlight, and to bash their opponents — or threaten retribution against them. It's an unholy mix, one where fairness, equity, the rule of law, and civility are all ignored in favour of the power dynamic.

Back in the mid-1930s, far away from my primary school playground, the so-called free world was coming face to face with the threat posed by the forces of authoritarianism. Apart from a Stalin-dominated Soviet Union, autocracies had already established themselves in Germany and Italy under Hitler and Mussolini, while an increasingly militaristic Japan led by Emperor Hirohito added yet another threat to the established order in East and Southeast Asia. It didn't take much of a crystal ball to see that their assertiveness, and quest for power and influence, were going to be a challenging issue in the years to come. In essence, what could the leading democracies do about keeping the dictatorships from wrecking the balance of power and threatening those states that didn't agree with them, or their policies of aggrandizement? This book examines one possibility, that looked for a few months in the latter part of 1937 as if it might be an option to tackle at least part of this dilemma.

Concern about the situation in the Far East had been a fluctuating source of worry for the British ever since the Washington Conference

of 1921-22 had confirmed American hostility to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was then brought to an undignified end without any worthwhile equivalent being put in its place. This was bad enough, but worse was to follow with the extraordinary decision inspired by the US to give the Japanese a dominant role in the western Pacific, by excluding any first-class naval bases for the British closer to Japan's shores than Singapore, and for the Americans closer than Pearl Harbor.[1] Seen as a quid pro quo for qualified Japanese acceptance of the 5-Power Naval Agreement, it was an accident waiting to happen. Once the period of Taishō democracy had collapsed, making way for increasing militarism in Japan by the beginning of the 1930s, that accident was much closer to taking place.

In this fetid atmosphere of mistrust, the last thing the democracies needed was for Japan to go on the war path, and yet that is exactly what happened. A long imperial fuse had been burning within the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) from the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. After the extraordinary victory of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) over the Russian fleet sent to defeat it in 1904-5, and the annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910, Japan had become the undisputed hegemon of East Asia. It continued to express its territorial ambitions at the outset of the First World War when it declared war on Germany and took over Kiautschou Bay — its leased territory in China — along with the German colonies in the Pacific (the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands). Japan also made a series of 21 Demands that the Chinese were forced to accept from the beginning of 1915 onwards.[2] Thereafter Japan's foothold and influence in China grew until the Mukden incident of September 1931 propelled the IJA into invading Manchuria and establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo in the following year.[3] Not surprisingly, relations between China and Japan continued to deteriorate in the aftermath of this latest example of foreign oppression with both sides aware that Manchukuo was merely a means to an end. Neither needed any further corroboration that the final Japanese objective — the subjugation of the entire Chinese mainland — remained to be accomplished.

After the Mukden incident of 1931 the British government found itself in a very difficult strategic position. In theory it had a 'Singapore Strategy', whereby the main fleet would sail to the Far East in the event of a war breaking out in the region. This may have been reassuring in theory, but the reality was much less convincing. Fudging on the design because of monetary constraints in the 1920s meant that, even when the new Sembawang naval base in Singapore was built in 1938-39, its operational status would still be on a peacetime footing in 1940. This meant that the dockyard was theoretically capable of docking and undertaking refits of nine cruisers a year.[4] For the base to be fully operational, and on a war footing, another year would be needed to reach that standard. Even then, it would only be able to accommodate a modest contingent of Royal Navy warships at any one time.[5] This was hardly likely to be a deterrent to the Japanese with a modern fleet that included ten aircraft carriers. This fact alone ought to have attracted more attention than it did because it begged a serious question, namely, would such a modest British force be able to hold its own against the modern Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) if it embarked upon war against the British, Dutch and French colonial forces in Southeast Asia? Moreover, quite what the ships that couldn't dock in the base were going to do other than sit out in the narrow Johor Strait, or hide somewhere amongst the islands of the Riau Archipelago, remained an open question — but a sensitive and beguiling one.

Long before the Singapore base was operational, the unstable situation in Europe seen in the aftermath of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the ongoing Spanish Civil War, had shown up the fecklessness of the democracies. France had hunkered down behind the Maginot Line of fortifications in an utterly defensive posture; the British had begun to rearm without enthusiasm; and the Americans, who could have made a difference if they had wanted to, remained in an isolationist mode, unwilling to revise or repudiate their neutrality legislation to involve themselves in global matters beyond their shores. It was a bleak and

disturbing period with little positive news to lift the mood. Worse still, the Japanese were no longer going to be bound by the limits set by the Washington Treaty system, and their relations with the British were a world away from the time they shared an alliance together, so the Royal Navy found itself in a very uncomfortable strategic position with little room to manoeuvre.

With this as the backcloth to its discussions, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) laid out the foreign and defence parameters for the Baldwin government in Whitehall, in February 1937. According to the COS, the security of the United Kingdom and of Singapore were the keystones on which the survival of the British Commonwealth would depend.[6] First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield supported this view in a COS meeting on 1 June when he stated that if the British lost their position in the Mediterranean it could be recovered, whereas the loss of their position in the Pacific might never be recovered. Therefore, the safety and use of the Singapore base by the Royal Navy was crucial for both the UK and the Commonwealth.

To make things even more complicated for the British the US Neutrality Act had received Roosevelt's signature and came into law on 1 May 1937. It may have accurately reflected American opinion about the dangers of being dragged into other nations' conflicts, but its provisions were problematic for the European democracies. Apart from anything else, the Americans placed a total prohibition on all arms supplies from the US. As things stood, those states that hadn't been stockpiling weapons — and who might now be confronted by those who had — were in a particularly vulnerable position, since they would not be able to draw upon US sources to make up for any deficiencies. Worse still, the neutrality legislation didn't differentiate between nations that were aggressive and those that weren't. As I have written elsewhere: "the legislation in its existing form aided those nations who wished to resort to aggression and penalized those who sought to maintain peace."[7] Although the British had tried to get the Americans to amend the bill before it became law in order

to make it less penalizing for the Western democracies, such was the strength of congressional opposition at this time that any modification of the legislation was ruled out.[8]

Nonetheless, the British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay was able to offer some hope that Anglo-American relations could be improved in the future by indicating that the US was prepared to exchange information of a very secret nature with selective departments of the British government.[9] If this was true it was a world away from the tension and friction that had followed the Washington Conference, when mutual mistrust had dominated naval affairs between the two sides and caused active disharmony for several years.[10] So, despite the doleful nature of the neutrality legislation, Lindsay put a positive spin on the outlook between the two countries going forward.

> Never in history have Anglo-American relations been so friendly and cordial as now, except during the eighteen months when the two countries were associated together in war.[11]

More positive news also came from Roosevelt's friend — and roving American envoy — Norman Davis, who indicated privately to both Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, when he met them in April 1937, that the President had raised the possibility of trying to make the Pacific a neutral area as a means of removing the threat of war in the region. Davis had gone on to suggest that the US would be willing to neutralize both the Philippines and Guam in the hope that the Dutch East Indies and Hong Kong would also receive the same treatment from their colonial governments. If true, this seemed an extraordinary development, and substantially different from the policy delineated by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Unfortunately, Davis was not really the most reliable of diplomats and was known for his exaggeration and whimsical reflections. Eden, although very pro-American, was cautious. Was this really the President's favourite project, as Davis indicated it was, or merely wishful thinking on the part of one or other of them? Who knew? Even if Roosevelt supported the idea in principle, was it even practical? Time

would tell. Would the President go against his own Secretary of State? It seemed unlikely. Hull was not an idealist given to making grand gestures. He was an experienced advocate who knew which proposed legislation he could potentially steer through Congress, and which ideas that might touch upon the reckless, he couldn't. Neutralizing the Pacific would not have sat easily with him or the isolationists in Congress, since it would almost certainly enflame tensions in both the Senate and House of Representatives, and undermine his own efforts to improve diplomatic relations around the world through a better and more effective system of international trade.[12]

Trial balloon or otherwise, the neutralization of the Pacific was not the only instance of Roosevelt's ideas being launched at this time. Joseph Lyons, the Australian Prime Minister, was to reveal at the Imperial Conference on 22 May that he had discussed a non-aggression pact in the Pacific with Roosevelt (FDR), who saw value in it and mentioned the possibility of forging an agreement with Japan — or any other country — to preserve peace in the Pacific. Apparently, FDR had gone on to tell Lyons that, if serious trouble loomed in the Pacific, the US would be prepared to make "common cause" with the Commonwealth members in that region.[13] Support for a more forward policy also came from Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, who indicated that FDR had told him that he was in favour of dismantling the fortifications of the Pacific islands as a tangible reward for ensuring peace in the Pacific.[14]

Any comfort Eden felt from the Davis-Lyons-Mackenzie King discussions was quickly dissipated by a message he received from Cordell Hull on 1 June, which outlined what FDR's seasoned secretary of state felt about dangers and threats to peace in the Pacific. Hull was not a flamboyant man or one given to spontaneity, unlike his President who was known for airing his personal views as trial balloons to see if they could fly.

> In the event of resort by any country or countries to measures of aggression in the Far East, we would expect to endeavour to afford within the limits of our general policy

> appropriate protection to our legitimate interests, but we are not, as we assume the British Government would not be, in position to state in advance what methods of protection this country would employ. It is the traditional policy of this country not to enter into those types of agreement which constitute or which suggest alliance.[15]

John Munro Troutbeck — who guided the American Department in the Foreign Office — was not a fan, calling Hull's message "a masterpiece of negation".[16] Troutbeck was being realistic. Hull's memo failed to specify what US policy in the Pacific might mean in the event of a crisis occurring in that ocean, other than to defend American interests if they were endangered. It certainly couldn't be construed to offer any genuine hope that the British could rely upon the Roosevelt administration to come to its aid, if Japan decided to move southwards from China into Southeast Asia.

As can be seen from this latest episode, American foreign policy had an astonishingly enigmatic quality to it at this time. What was possible and what was not, was something the British were constantly evaluating. It was not straightforward and Lindsay, from his embassy in Washington, put it best when he concluded that "Anglo-American relations were fool-proof and were only in danger when attempts were made to improve them."[17] Eden may have taken this advice at this stage, but he would ignore it totally in the months to come.

But where did this uncertainty leave the Commonwealth? Sir Samuel Hoare, the First Lord of the Admiralty, tried his best to lift the mood of doom and gloom when greeting the Commonwealth delegates gathered in London for the Imperial Conference in May 1937. Seeking to downplay concerns about future foreign and defence policy east of Suez, Hoare set out the British government's case in the following manner:

> At the present moment we are satisfied that our naval strength would allow us to dispatch an adequate fleet to the Far East whilst retaining sufficient strength in Home Waters to cover our European commitments. Looking ahead we appreciate that

> there will be a period, from the Spring of 1938 to the Summer of of 1939, when we could only retain forces in Home Waters barely adequate to meet the naval forces of Germany and we must rely on being assisted by the French Navy. We could still send to the Far East a Fleet, but it would be, from a purely material point of view, slightly inferior to the full Japanese naval strength. By the adoption of a defensive policy, and, relying on the superior fighting qualities of the British race, this Fleet should achieve its object of assuring the Dominions from serious aggression.[18]

Hoare's intentions may have been good, but his speech was hardly a dynamic endorsement of the 'Singapore Strategy' even if it was supportive of it. It was suspiciously light on details. What, for instance, would the size of an "adequate fleet" be that could be sent to Singapore to face the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) if its former ally decided to implement its favoured strategy of *Nanshin-ron* (southward expansion)? Given that three of the Royal Navy's fifteen capital ships would be undergoing repair and modernization during 1938-39, and four more capital ships would remain in Home Waters to deal with any challenge from the German Kriegsmarine, that would mean that a maximum of only eight capital ships could be sent out east during this period.[19] Needless to say, if the French didn't play ball and assist the British, the incoming Chamberlain Government would be in a bit of a pickle.[20] Unfortunately to make things worse, fighting away from home was always thought to be worth the equivalent of two capital ships, so the math didn't look particularly impressive if the IJN steamed south with its Combined Fleet to take on whatever force the Royal Navy could assemble in the 1938-39 period. Moreover, Hoare did not speculate on how long the fleet would be expected to stay out in Southeast Asia to preserve British and Commonwealth interests. As for confidently relying upon the superior fighting qualities of the British race, he was also underestimating the military effectiveness of the Japanese, something the West was often guilty of when it came to assessing its rivals.

Hoare's speech typically lacked candour and was both ambiguous and unreliable. It did conform, however, in tone to one that he had prepared for the British Cabinet before the Imperial Conference had begun. In his notes drafted in March and April 1937 he stated:

> I suggest that on no account should I say anything that would imply that we shall not have a fleet capable of action in the East as well as in the West, but that I should emphasise the almost intolerable strain that such a fleet imposes upon us, point out that for the present we are almost entirely occupied with replacement and leave them under the impression that any New Standard must inevitably depend on their fuller and further co-operation (e.g. more cruisers and destroyers)[21]

In essence, the question was — could the UK afford to build beyond the old and now defunct Washington Treaty limits if its potential enemies were doing so both in Europe and in Asia? This was a momentous question, but the answer was obvious, namely, how could His Majesty's Government (HMG) afford not to do so? Yet the predicament was complicated, because it was not just a question of whether the money was there to build more ships, but of the three to four years it would take for the Royal Navy to have new capital ships fully operational and at their disposal wherever they were needed most of all. Ultimately, Hoare's plan was to reaffirm the short-term commitment to the Singapore Strategy while keeping the dominions guessing as to British defence policy in the long term.[22]

It wasn't a very satisfactory way of treating one's friends and Chamberlain, newly installed as Prime Minister, used the opportunity of a speech to the principal delegates to the Imperial Conference on 2 June to set the record straight.[23] He informed the Commonwealth representatives that, if Japanese forces used a complex and troubling situation in Europe to take concrete steps against British interests in the Far East, the British would be unable to take action against them. Chamberlain's point underlined a crucial fact, namely, the current inability of the UK to defend its interests in two oceans simultaneously. This reality was tellingly expressed by the Chiefs of Staff (COS) in

their 'Far East Appreciation', a copy of which was passed to the Australian, Indian, and New Zealand delegates at the conference. In paragraph 112, the COS revealed that if a war with Japan broke out when the UK and France were already at war with Germany, the fleet that could be sent out east would only be decided in the light of the situation at the time.

> We cannot accurately forecast the delay which might occur before we could dispatch a fleet to the Far East, since it must depend on the naval and political situation at the time. If Japan undertakes deliberate operations against Singapore, unless we have been able to reinforce the garrison and to raise the reserve supplies beyond 60 days, a situation may occur in which we shall have to risk seriously prejudicing our naval operations against Germany in order to dispatch a fleet to the Far East in time to relieve Singapore.[24]

What this document made clear was that a 'period before relief' of at least sixty days had been built into the 'Singapore Strategy'. And yet from the language of the Appreciation, the possibility remained that the two-month delay before a fleet could arrive in Singaporean waters could easily be increased by another unspecified amount of time in the future. This was not an unreasonable assumption to make given that it would take between four to six weeks' steaming time for the slowest members of the fleet to make the journey out east. Another troubling feature was the fact that the size of fleet to be sent east of Suez, in the event of war with Japan, was not spelled out in the report. If the intention was for the COS to keep the dominions guessing about the 'Singapore Strategy' in an emergency, the report did exactly that. It mixed wishful thinking with uncertainty. Would the fleet be able to perform anything other than purely defensive duties, and would that be sufficient to keep the Japanese at bay in wartime for possibly months on end? Who knew? Would Anglo-Japanese relations improve to the extent that war would become unthinkable? An unlikely possibility. Would the Americans consent to join the British in trying to cultivate peace in the Pacific? Maybe, but maybe not. All in all,

therefore, the 'Far East Appreciation' made for uncomfortable reading in both Canberra and Wellington.

One thing that was certain, however, was that change was coming on both sides of the Atlantic. Roosevelt's second presidential term had already begun with security problems growing around the world. These events would help to ensure that domestic policy could not dominate the agenda in the US as it had between 1933-36. In the UK the retirement of the dependable Stanley Baldwin as prime minister — a politician who felt much more comfortable dealing with domestic issues rather than foreign policy — and his replacement by the capable but rather dour Neville Chamberlain in late May 1937, created another set of possibilities. Excitement wasn't one of them. Chamberlain could not be described as charismatic, but he was self-confident and stubborn. He had been a cabinet minister from 1922-29 and again from 1931 onwards. His forte was at the Treasury where he had twice been Chancellor of the Exchequer under both Baldwin and MacDonald. Chamberlain's lack of foreign policy expertise did not inhibit the new Prime Minister, as Eden was soon to discover. After largely having his own way with Baldwin, the Foreign Secretary was faced with a leader who wanted to have a more hands-on approach to dealing with international relations. Where did this leave Eden? Uneasy and to some extent potentially undermined. He didn't wish to share his power or responsibility with anyone else, least of all someone who had never worked in the Foreign Office. In the weeks and months to come, therefore, a growing resentment on the part of Eden became more obvious and a rift opened up between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.[25]

If American defence policy could be described as being in a state of flux, so could its British counterpart. Although the COS hoped for an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations as a means of reducing tension in East Asia, it was bound to be a long shot. For instance, what on earth could the British offer the Japanese as a sweetener for a much closer relationship? In short, there was nothing they could do to assuage the territorial instincts of the Japanese military national-

ists who were now running the Imperial and General Headquarters in Tokyo. Japan could either go further north into China and Mongolia, as the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) wished (*Hokushin-ron*), or it could go south into Southeast Asia (*Nanshin-ron*) as the IJN desired, and both options were still very much on the table in early 1937. In any case, Eden never bought into appeasing the Japanese. He didn't believe that expecting moderation from them was a likely possibility under any circumstances, and much preferred a distinctly different strategy —the courting of the Americans as a viable alternative. Unfortunately, the burning question was, who ran US foreign policy? It was difficult to fathom out the FDR-Hull axis. Did the President hold the upper hand, or was he just an interested observer? If the former, Eden may have had a chance to bring the Americans on board in some way. If the latter, much less of one. But the same vital question could be asked of the UK after Chamberlain became Prime Minister in late May 1937. Did Chamberlain run the show, or Eden? Who was the star turn?

Eden had used Norman Davis as an emissary of sorts, in the hope that Davis would persuade his friend the President to encourage the State Department to invite the Foreign Secretary to Washington. As a plan, it didn't succeed. Davis didn't circumvent Hull and instead of Eden being invited to the US, Chamberlain was invited to meet FDR instead. Unfortunately, the newly installed Prime Minister didn't think a state visit was a sensible option at this time, because expectations would be raised ahead of such a meeting and it was difficult to see what constructive agreement could be reached at this stage between the two powers.[26] Chamberlain's response was regrettable. What did he really have to lose in meeting FDR? Instead of being able to talk to Roosevelt privately about British aims and aspirations, he gave up the opportunity. It was a classic own goal, and not the last he would score in the next couple of years. What did his rejection of the offer say about his reading of Anglo-American relations in 1937? Lindsay had spoken of fool-proof relations in addressing the cross Atlantic ties of the two powers, and Chamberlain's response to Davis

suggests that he agreed with the British Ambassador's reading of the situation.

Other factors also played their part in this situation. Captain Russell Willson, the US Naval Attaché, had indicated in a meeting on 4 June with Rear Admiral J.A.G. Troup — the Admiralty's Director of Naval Intelligence — that closer cooperation between the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Navy would be beneficial to both sides in the future. While Troup was not averse to giving some kind of preferential treatment to the Americans, the same could not be said of his skeptical superiors in the Board of Admiralty. For them the fact that the London Naval Treaty of 1936 had not yet been ratified meant that they felt unable to exchange information on, say, Japanese naval construction with the Americans — a topic that Willson was most anxious to discuss.[27] This seems an excessive and frankly absurd reaction, given that the IJN was a potential threat in the region and both the US Navy and the Royal Navy had a vested interest in learning about what the Japanese were doing, now that they had thrown off the shackles of the Washington Naval Treaty system. But it also suggests that the shadow of the 1920s, when Anglo-American naval relations had been so poor, had not been entirely lifted in the years thereafter.

In the post WWII period, the Churchillian term of a 'special relationship' has often been used to describe Anglo-American relations. Back in the early summer of 1937, however, this would not have been an entirely apposite description of how each side saw the other.

1. "Look Back in Anger: Western Naval Powers and the Washington Conference," in B.J.C. McKercher (ed.), *Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939* (Westport, Conn, 1992), pp.83-103.
2. W.G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945* (Oxford, 1987), pp.41-121, 175-209
3. Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period* (Westport, Conn, 2002); Ferrell, Robert H. (March 1955). "The Muk-

den Incident: September 18–19, 1931". *Journal of Modern History*. 27 (1), 66–72.

4. Malcolm Murfett, "Living in the Past: A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore Naval Strategy, 1918-1941", *War & Society*, Vol.11, No.1 (1993), 73-103.
5. Murfett, *Fool-proof Relations*, p.13, fn.29
6. COS Review, CID 1305B, (Revise), paras.79-81, 22 February 1937, Cab 4/25
7. Murfett, *Fool-proof Relations*, p.21
8. British departmental concern over the US Neutrality Act can be seen in a whole series of files in Prem 1/261, Adm 116/4102, FO 371/20666. For the American perspective on this question, *see* Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago, 1962)
9. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 26 January 1937, No.25, A665/38/45, FO 371/20951
10. Malcolm H Murfett, "'Are We Ready?' The Development of American and British Naval Strategy, 1922-39", in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (eds.), *Maritime Strategy and Balance of Power* (Oxford, 1989), pp.214-42
11. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 22 March 1937, No.247, A2378/38/45, FO 371/20651
12. Eden to Lindsay, 22 May 1937, No.434, F2586/597/61, FO 371/21024; Memo by State Department, undated but handed to Lindsay on 1 June 1937, attached to Lindsay to Eden, 1 June 1937, No.492, A4165/228/45, FO 371/20660
13. E(P.D.) (37) First Meeting, 19 May 1937, Cab 32/128
14. Ibid.
15. Lindsay to Eden, 1 June 1937, No.492, A4165/228/45, FO 371/20660
16. Minute by J.M. Troutbeck, 17 June 1937, A4165/228/45, FO 371/20660
17. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 22 March 1937, No.247, A2378/38/45, FO 371/20651

18. E(P.D.) (37) Seventh Meeting, 26 May 1937, Cab 32/128
19. Murfett, *Fool-proof Relations*, pp.1-33
20. Neville Chamberlain succeeded Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister on 28 May 1937.
21. Cambridge University Library, (Templewood Papers), Notes for Cabinet Speech, March-April 1937, IX 2
22. E(P.D.) (37) Seventh Meeting, 26 May 1937, Cab 32/128
23. After a Cabinet reshuffle when Chamberlain became Prime Minister on 28 May, Hoare left the Admiralty to become Home Secretary. He was replaced at the Admiralty by Alfred Duff Cooper who had formerly been at the War Office.
24. COS 596, "Far East Appreciation 1937", 14 June 1937, also circulated as DP(P)5, para.112, Cab 16/182
25. Conversation with Malcolm MacDonald, London, 10 Oct.1978.
26. N. Chamberlain to N. Davis, 8 July 1937, Prem 1/261
27. Minute by Capt. T.S.V. Phillips (Director of Plans), 29 June 1937, M03421/37, Adm116/4302.